XAdES インスペクター
XAdES 署名を含む XML 文書を貼り付けるか、ファイルから開いてください。インスペクターは各 XML 署名を検証してベースラインレベルを判定し、依拠当事者が頼りにするプロパティをチェックします。
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出典:欧州委員会が 2026年10月15日に公開した EU のトラステッドリスト一覧を、改変せずに使用しています(欧州委員会決定 2011/833/EU)。検証の基準時刻は 2026年10月20日です。
信頼
チェックしない項目
- タイムスタンプトークン(SignatureTimeStamp、ArchiveTimeStamp)は検出・カウントしてレベルの判定に反映しますが、中身は開きません。時刻、TSA の署名、メッセージインプリントは検証しません。
- 長期検証のために埋め込まれた失効情報は数えるだけで評価はせず、外部からの取得も行いません。署名者の証明書の現在のステータスはオンラインで確認しません。
- 署名ポリシーは識別してそのハッシュ値を表示しますが、ポリシー文書の取得や適用は行いません。
XML signatures with legal weight
XAdES — XML Advanced Electronic Signatures, ETSI EN 319 132-1 — is how XML documents are signed under the EU's eIDAS regulation: the trusted lists that tell browsers and PDF readers which trust service providers are qualified, e-invoices in many countries, tax filings, court documents. It is an ordinary XML signature with qualifying properties attached: who signed (a reference to the signing certificate), when (a claimed signing time), under which rules (a signature policy), what was signed (the data object formats), and — added later as unsigned properties — time-stamps and the certificates and revocation data needed to validate the signature years from now.
Baseline levels
EN 319 132-1 defines four baseline levels, each building on the previous one:
| Level | Adds | What it gives you |
|---|---|---|
| B-B | signed properties: SigningCertificateV2, SigningTime, DataObjectFormat… | a signature bound to its signer's certificate |
| B-T | a SignatureTimeStamp from a time-stamping authority | proof the signature existed at that time |
| B-LT | certificates and revocation data (CertificateValues, RevocationValues) | validation without contacting anyone, after certificates expire |
| B-LTA | archive time-stamps over all of it | protection against weakened algorithms, renewable |
The older forms of ETSI TS 101 903 — BES, EPES, T, C, X, X-L, A — are still common, and the inspector names both the baseline level and the legacy form it recognises from the properties present.
What the inspector verifies
For every ds:Signature in the document:
- The XML signature itself — every
Referenceresolved and digested after its transforms, and the signature value over the canonicalSignedInfo— with the same code as the SAML inspector. References to content outside the document are digested from files you choose, read in the page. - SignedProperties is covered. A reference of type
#SignedPropertiesmust point at the signed properties; otherwise everything XAdES adds is unsigned decoration. - The signing-certificate reference: the digest and issuer/serial in SigningCertificate or SigningCertificateV2 must match the certificate that actually verifies the signature — the protection against substituting another certificate of the same key.
- The signing time — a valid xs:dateTime with a time zone, not in the future, inside the certificate's validity.
- The signer's certificate: subject, issuer, validity, and its QC statements (EN 319 412-5): whether it is an EU qualified certificate, whether the key is on a qualified signature creation device, its type (e-signature, e-seal, website) and the legislation it is qualified under. With trusted certificates you paste, the path from the signer to them is built and checked.
- The policy and data object formats, and the level, with notes when the properties present are inconsistent (validation data without a time-stamp, an archive time-stamp without validation data).
The example is the real EU List of Trusted Lists, an enveloped XAdES B-B signature by the European Commission with RSA-SHA512 and SigningCertificateV2, published on 15 October 2026. The XML-DSig pitfalls it shares with SAML are covered in SAML signature validation: what to check and why.