XAdES 查看器
粘贴或打开带有 XAdES 签名的 XML 文档。查看器会验证每个 XML 签名,判断其基线级别,并检查依赖方所依靠的各项属性。
100% 本地运行——所有操作都在你的浏览器中完成,不会向任何服务器发送数据
来源:欧盟委员会发布的欧盟可信列表总表(2026年10月15日版),未经修改(委员会决定 2011/833/EU)。检查日期:2026年10月20日。
信任
不检查的内容
- 工具会找出时间戳令牌(SignatureTimeStamp、ArchiveTimeStamp)、统计数量并归入相应级别,但不会打开它们:不验证其中的时间、TSA 签名和消息印记。
- 为长期验证而内嵌的吊销数据只计数、不评估,也不会获取任何数据:不在线检查签名者证书的当前状态。
- 会识别签名策略并报告其哈希,但不会获取或应用策略文档。
XML signatures with legal weight
XAdES — XML Advanced Electronic Signatures, ETSI EN 319 132-1 — is how XML documents are signed under the EU's eIDAS regulation: the trusted lists that tell browsers and PDF readers which trust service providers are qualified, e-invoices in many countries, tax filings, court documents. It is an ordinary XML signature with qualifying properties attached: who signed (a reference to the signing certificate), when (a claimed signing time), under which rules (a signature policy), what was signed (the data object formats), and — added later as unsigned properties — time-stamps and the certificates and revocation data needed to validate the signature years from now.
Baseline levels
EN 319 132-1 defines four baseline levels, each building on the previous one:
| Level | Adds | What it gives you |
|---|---|---|
| B-B | signed properties: SigningCertificateV2, SigningTime, DataObjectFormat… | a signature bound to its signer's certificate |
| B-T | a SignatureTimeStamp from a time-stamping authority | proof the signature existed at that time |
| B-LT | certificates and revocation data (CertificateValues, RevocationValues) | validation without contacting anyone, after certificates expire |
| B-LTA | archive time-stamps over all of it | protection against weakened algorithms, renewable |
The older forms of ETSI TS 101 903 — BES, EPES, T, C, X, X-L, A — are still common, and the inspector names both the baseline level and the legacy form it recognises from the properties present.
What the inspector verifies
For every ds:Signature in the document:
- The XML signature itself — every
Referenceresolved and digested after its transforms, and the signature value over the canonicalSignedInfo— with the same code as the SAML inspector. References to content outside the document are digested from files you choose, read in the page. - SignedProperties is covered. A reference of type
#SignedPropertiesmust point at the signed properties; otherwise everything XAdES adds is unsigned decoration. - The signing-certificate reference: the digest and issuer/serial in SigningCertificate or SigningCertificateV2 must match the certificate that actually verifies the signature — the protection against substituting another certificate of the same key.
- The signing time — a valid xs:dateTime with a time zone, not in the future, inside the certificate's validity.
- The signer's certificate: subject, issuer, validity, and its QC statements (EN 319 412-5): whether it is an EU qualified certificate, whether the key is on a qualified signature creation device, its type (e-signature, e-seal, website) and the legislation it is qualified under. With trusted certificates you paste, the path from the signer to them is built and checked.
- The policy and data object formats, and the level, with notes when the properties present are inconsistent (validation data without a time-stamp, an archive time-stamp without validation data).
The example is the real EU List of Trusted Lists, an enveloped XAdES B-B signature by the European Commission with RSA-SHA512 and SigningCertificateV2, published on 15 October 2026. The XML-DSig pitfalls it shares with SAML are covered in SAML signature validation: what to check and why.