SAML 签名验证：检查什么，为什么检查

<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" ID="_ef6e7d7e83384141a7a16e6fb9d52d61" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2026-10-20T13:39:36Z" Destination="https://sp.example/saml/acs" InResponseTo="_req-7d1f">
  <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example/saml</saml:Issuer>
  <samlp:Status><samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/></samlp:Status>
  <saml:Assertion ID="_cf908bd7284743f8997ddd7943f6640c" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2026-10-20T13:39:36Z">
    <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example/saml</saml:Issuer>
    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"><ds:SignedInfo><ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/><ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#ecdsa-sha256"/><ds:Reference URI="#_cf908bd7284743f8997ddd7943f6640c"><ds:Transforms><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/><ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/></ds:Transforms><ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/><ds:DigestValue>genlRcOfIZpWA8BHZ0Eo42LeZcRMriskgTApPDxsPI0=</ds:DigestValue></ds:Reference></ds:SignedInfo><ds:SignatureValue>cPF5v/9Ve6uUmgcn...</ds:SignatureValue><ds:KeyInfo><ds:X509Data><ds:X509Certificate>MIIBPDCB4qADAgEC...</ds:X509Certificate></ds:X509Data></ds:KeyInfo></ds:Signature><saml:Subject>
      <saml:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress">alice@example.com</saml:NameID>
      <saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
        <saml:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="2026-10-20T13:44:36Z" Recipient="https://sp.example/saml/acs" InResponseTo="_req-7d1f"/>
      </saml:SubjectConfirmation>
    </saml:Subject>
    <saml:Conditions NotBefore="2026-10-20T13:39:36Z" NotOnOrAfter="2026-10-20T13:44:36Z">
      <saml:AudienceRestriction><saml:Audience>https://sp.example/saml</saml:Audience></saml:AudienceRestriction>
    </saml:Conditions>
    <saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="2026-10-20T13:39:36Z"><saml:AuthnContext>
      <saml:AuthnContextClassRef>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport</saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
    </saml:AuthnContext></saml:AuthnStatement>
  </saml:Assertion></samlp:Response>

# Service provider side: verify the signature, then read every value from the signed Assertion only.
import datetime

from cryptography import x509
from signxml import SignatureConfiguration, XMLVerifier

SAMLP = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
SAML = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
NS = {"samlp": SAMLP, "saml": SAML}
BEARER = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"


class SamlError(Exception):
    pass


def _time(value):
    return datetime.datetime.strptime(value, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ").replace(tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)


def validate_response(xml: bytes, *, idp_cert: x509.Certificate, idp_entity_id: str, sp_entity_id: str,
                      acs_url: str, request_id: str, seen_assertion_ids: set, skew=60, now=None):
    now = now or datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
    lag = datetime.timedelta(seconds=skew)

    # 1. The signature: pinned IdP certificate from metadata (never the one in KeyInfo),
    #    exactly one Reference, ds:Signature where SAML puts it: inside the Assertion.
    config = SignatureConfiguration(location=f"./{{{SAML}}}Assertion/", expect_references=1)
    try:
        result = XMLVerifier().verify(xml, x509_cert=idp_cert, expect_config=config)
    except Exception as e:  # signxml raises InvalidSignature, InvalidInput and others
        raise SamlError(f"signature: {type(e).__name__}: {e}") from None

    # 2. From here on, only the element the signature covers. Never the document passed in.
    assertion = result.signed_xml
    if assertion.tag != f"{{{SAML}}}Assertion":
        raise SamlError(f"signed element is {assertion.tag}, not an Assertion")
    aid = assertion.get("ID")
    one = lambda path: assertion.find(path, NS)

    if (one("saml:Issuer").text or "").strip() != idp_entity_id:
        raise SamlError("issuer")
    conditions = one("saml:Conditions")
    if conditions is None:
        raise SamlError("no Conditions")
    if now + lag < _time(conditions.get("NotBefore")) or now - lag >= _time(conditions.get("NotOnOrAfter")):
        raise SamlError("assertion is outside its validity window")
    audiences = [a.text for a in conditions.findall("saml:AudienceRestriction/saml:Audience", NS)]
    if sp_entity_id not in audiences:
        raise SamlError(f"audience {audiences} is not this SP")

    # 3. A bearer SubjectConfirmation for this ACS URL, this request, still valid.
    data = one(f"saml:Subject/saml:SubjectConfirmation[@Method='{BEARER}']/saml:SubjectConfirmationData")
    if data is None:
        raise SamlError("no bearer SubjectConfirmationData")
    if data.get("Recipient") != acs_url:
        raise SamlError(f"recipient {data.get('Recipient')}")
    if now - lag >= _time(data.get("NotOnOrAfter")):
        raise SamlError("subject confirmation expired")
    if data.get("InResponseTo") != request_id:
        raise SamlError("InResponseTo does not match the AuthnRequest")

    # 4. One use per assertion ID, for as long as the assertion could be accepted.
    if aid in seen_assertion_ids:
        raise SamlError(f"assertion {aid} already used")
    seen_assertion_ids.add(aid)

    name_id = one("saml:Subject/saml:NameID")
    return {"name_id": "".join(name_id.itertext()), "assertion_id": aid}

# Anti-pattern, for comparison only: the signature is checked, but the values come from the
# document as received instead of from the element the signature covers.
from lxml import etree
from signxml import SignatureConfiguration, XMLVerifier

NS = {"samlp": "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol", "saml": "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"}


def naive_validate(xml: bytes, *, idp_cert, sp_entity_id: str, acs_url: str, request_id: str):
    config = SignatureConfiguration(location="./{urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion}Assertion/", expect_references=1)
    XMLVerifier().verify(xml, x509_cert=idp_cert, expect_config=config)  # result ignored
    doc = etree.fromstring(xml)
    assertion = doc.find("saml:Assertion", NS)  # the first Assertion in the document
    assert sp_entity_id in [a.text for a in assertion.findall(".//saml:Audience", NS)]
    data = assertion.find(".//saml:SubjectConfirmationData", NS)
    assert data.get("Recipient") == acs_url and data.get("InResponseTo") == request_id
    return {"name_id": assertion.find("saml:Subject/saml:NameID", NS).text}

# Lab identity provider: a key and self-signed certificate generated per run, and signed SAML Responses.
import datetime
import uuid

from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID
from lxml import etree
from signxml import XMLSigner
from signxml.algorithms import CanonicalizationMethod, SignatureMethod

SAMLP = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
SAML = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"


def new_idp(name):
    key = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
    subject = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, name)])
    now = datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
    cert = (
        x509.CertificateBuilder()
        .subject_name(subject).issuer_name(subject).public_key(key.public_key())
        .serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
        .not_valid_before(now - datetime.timedelta(minutes=5)).not_valid_after(now + datetime.timedelta(days=30))
        .sign(key, hashes.SHA256())
    )
    return key, cert


def iso(t):
    return t.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")


def response(key, cert, *, name_id, audience, recipient, in_response_to, issuer="https://idp.example/saml",
             valid_for=300, now=None):
    """A Response with one signed Assertion: enveloped signature, exclusive C14N, Reference URI=#ID."""
    now = now or datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
    until = now + datetime.timedelta(seconds=valid_for)
    aid = f"_{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
    xml = f"""<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="{SAMLP}" xmlns:saml="{SAML}" ID="_{uuid.uuid4().hex}" Version="2.0"
  IssueInstant="{iso(now)}" Destination="{recipient}" InResponseTo="{in_response_to}">
  <saml:Issuer>{issuer}</saml:Issuer>
  <samlp:Status><samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/></samlp:Status>
  <saml:Assertion ID="{aid}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{iso(now)}">
    <saml:Issuer>{issuer}</saml:Issuer>
    <saml:Subject>
      <saml:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress">{name_id}</saml:NameID>
      <saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
        <saml:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="{iso(until)}" Recipient="{recipient}" InResponseTo="{in_response_to}"/>
      </saml:SubjectConfirmation>
    </saml:Subject>
    <saml:Conditions NotBefore="{iso(now)}" NotOnOrAfter="{iso(until)}">
      <saml:AudienceRestriction><saml:Audience>{audience}</saml:Audience></saml:AudienceRestriction>
    </saml:Conditions>
    <saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="{iso(now)}"><saml:AuthnContext>
      <saml:AuthnContextClassRef>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport</saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
    </saml:AuthnContext></saml:AuthnStatement>
  </saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>"""
    root = etree.fromstring(xml.encode())
    assertion = root.find(f"{{{SAML}}}Assertion")
    signed = XMLSigner(
        signature_algorithm=SignatureMethod.ECDSA_SHA256,
        c14n_algorithm=CanonicalizationMethod.EXCLUSIVE_XML_CANONICALIZATION_1_0,
    ).sign(assertion, key=key, cert=[cert], reference_uri=aid)
    # SAML requires ds:Signature right after saml:Issuer inside the signed element.
    sig = signed.find("{http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#}Signature")
    signed.remove(sig)
    signed.insert(1, sig)
    root.replace(assertion, signed)
    return etree.tostring(root)

# Lab driver: valid and manipulated SAML Responses against the validator (sp.py) and the anti-pattern (naive.py).
import copy
import datetime
import re

from lxml import etree

from idp import SAML, new_idp, response
from naive import naive_validate
from sp import SamlError, validate_response

key, cert = new_idp("idp.example signing")
other_key, other_cert = new_idp("idp.example signing")  # same name, different key: not the IdP
SP = {"sp_entity_id": "https://sp.example/saml", "acs_url": "https://sp.example/saml/acs", "request_id": "_req-7d1f"}
seen = set()


def issue(name_id="alice@example.com", **kw):
    args = {"audience": SP["sp_entity_id"], "recipient": SP["acs_url"], "in_response_to": SP["request_id"], **kw}
    return response(args.pop("key", key), args.pop("cert", cert), name_id=name_id, **args)


def check(label, xml, **kw):
    try:
        ours = validate_response(xml, idp_cert=cert, idp_entity_id="https://idp.example/saml",
                                 seen_assertion_ids=seen, **SP, **kw)
        ours = f"login as {ours['name_id']}"
    except SamlError as e:
        ours = f"rejected: {e}"
    try:
        naive = f"login as {naive_validate(xml, idp_cert=cert, **SP)['name_id']}"
    except Exception as e:
        naive = f"rejected: {type(e).__name__}"
    print(f"{label}\n  validator:    {ours}\n  anti-pattern: {naive}")


check("valid response", issue())

# Signature wrapping: an unsigned Assertion inserted before the signed one. The signature still
# verifies, because its Reference points by ID at the original Assertion.
doc = etree.fromstring(issue())
signed = doc.find(f"{{{SAML}}}Assertion")
forged = copy.deepcopy(signed)
forged.remove(forged.find("{http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#}Signature"))
forged.set("ID", "_forged")
forged.find(f"{{{SAML}}}Subject/{{{SAML}}}NameID").text = "admin@example.com"
doc.insert(list(doc).index(signed), forged)
check("unsigned Assertion before the signed one", etree.tostring(doc))

# A comment inside the signed NameID: exclusive C14N without comments ignores it, so the
# signature stays valid; .text on the received document stops at the comment.
xml = issue("admin@example.com.evil.test")
xml = xml.replace(b"admin@example.com.evil.test<", b"admin@example.com<!---->.evil.test<")
check("comment inside the signed NameID", xml)

check("assertion for another SP", issue(audience="https://other-sp.example/saml"))
check("expired 10 minutes ago", issue(now=datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc) - datetime.timedelta(minutes=15)))
replay = issue()
check("first use", replay)
check("same assertion again", replay)
tampered = issue().replace(b"alice@example.com", b"admin@example.com")
check("NameID edited after signing", tampered)
check("signed with another key + its cert", issue(key=other_key, cert=other_cert))
stripped = re.sub(rb"<ds:Signature.*?</ds:Signature>", b"", issue(), flags=re.S)
check("signature removed", stripped)

valid response
  validator:    login as alice@example.com
  anti-pattern: login as alice@example.com
unsigned Assertion before the signed one
  validator:    login as alice@example.com
  anti-pattern: login as admin@example.com
comment inside the signed NameID
  validator:    login as admin@example.com.evil.test
  anti-pattern: login as admin@example.com
assertion for another SP
  validator:    rejected: audience ['https://other-sp.example/saml'] is not this SP
  anti-pattern: rejected: AssertionError
expired 10 minutes ago
  validator:    rejected: assertion is outside its validity window
  anti-pattern: login as alice@example.com
first use
  validator:    login as alice@example.com
  anti-pattern: login as alice@example.com
same assertion again
  validator:    rejected: assertion _2291663e82ca413bb791278fa3a9a3f8 already used
  anti-pattern: login as alice@example.com
NameID edited after signing
  validator:    rejected: signature: InvalidDigest: Digest mismatch for reference 0 (#_37ad00c1109f47e3b3b1b650a17aba70)
  anti-pattern: rejected: InvalidDigest
signed with another key + its cert
  validator:    rejected: signature: InvalidSignature: Signature verification failed: 
  anti-pattern: rejected: InvalidSignature
signature removed
  validator:    rejected: signature: InvalidInput: Expected to find XML element Signature in {urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol}Response using XPath ./{urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion}Assertion/ds:Signature
  anti-pattern: rejected: InvalidInput