Inspector de XAdES online
Pega o abre un documento XML con firmas XAdES. El inspector verifica cada firma XML, determina su nivel baseline y comprueba las propiedades de las que depende la parte que confía en la firma.
100 % local: todo se ejecuta en tu navegador y nada se envía a ningún servidor
Fuente: La Lista de listas de confianza de la UE tal como la publicó la Comisión Europea el 2026-10-15, sin modificar (Decisión 2011/833/UE de la Comisión). Comprobada el 2026-10-20.
Confianza
Qué no se comprueba
- Los tokens de sello de tiempo (SignatureTimeStamp, ArchiveTimeStamp) se localizan, se cuentan y se asignan a un nivel, pero no se abren: no se verifican su hora, la firma de la TSA ni la huella del mensaje.
- Los datos de revocación incrustados para la validación a largo plazo se cuentan, pero no se evalúan, y no se descarga nada: el estado actual del certificado del firmante no se comprueba en línea.
- La política de firma se identifica y se muestra su hash, pero el documento de la política no se descarga ni se aplica.
XML signatures with legal weight
XAdES — XML Advanced Electronic Signatures, ETSI EN 319 132-1 — is how XML documents are signed under the EU's eIDAS regulation: the trusted lists that tell browsers and PDF readers which trust service providers are qualified, e-invoices in many countries, tax filings, court documents. It is an ordinary XML signature with qualifying properties attached: who signed (a reference to the signing certificate), when (a claimed signing time), under which rules (a signature policy), what was signed (the data object formats), and — added later as unsigned properties — time-stamps and the certificates and revocation data needed to validate the signature years from now.
Baseline levels
EN 319 132-1 defines four baseline levels, each building on the previous one:
| Level | Adds | What it gives you |
|---|---|---|
| B-B | signed properties: SigningCertificateV2, SigningTime, DataObjectFormat… | a signature bound to its signer's certificate |
| B-T | a SignatureTimeStamp from a time-stamping authority | proof the signature existed at that time |
| B-LT | certificates and revocation data (CertificateValues, RevocationValues) | validation without contacting anyone, after certificates expire |
| B-LTA | archive time-stamps over all of it | protection against weakened algorithms, renewable |
The older forms of ETSI TS 101 903 — BES, EPES, T, C, X, X-L, A — are still common, and the inspector names both the baseline level and the legacy form it recognises from the properties present.
What the inspector verifies
For every ds:Signature in the document:
- The XML signature itself — every
Referenceresolved and digested after its transforms, and the signature value over the canonicalSignedInfo— with the same code as the SAML inspector. References to content outside the document are digested from files you choose, read in the page. - SignedProperties is covered. A reference of type
#SignedPropertiesmust point at the signed properties; otherwise everything XAdES adds is unsigned decoration. - The signing-certificate reference: the digest and issuer/serial in SigningCertificate or SigningCertificateV2 must match the certificate that actually verifies the signature — the protection against substituting another certificate of the same key.
- The signing time — a valid xs:dateTime with a time zone, not in the future, inside the certificate's validity.
- The signer's certificate: subject, issuer, validity, and its QC statements (EN 319 412-5): whether it is an EU qualified certificate, whether the key is on a qualified signature creation device, its type (e-signature, e-seal, website) and the legislation it is qualified under. With trusted certificates you paste, the path from the signer to them is built and checked.
- The policy and data object formats, and the level, with notes when the properties present are inconsistent (validation data without a time-stamp, an archive time-stamp without validation data).
The example is the real EU List of Trusted Lists, an enveloped XAdES B-B signature by the European Commission with RSA-SHA512 and SigningCertificateV2, published on 15 October 2026. The XML-DSig pitfalls it shares with SAML are covered in SAML signature validation: what to check and why.