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Post-Quantum Algorithm Zoo: Sizes and Speed of 100+ Algorithms

All 103 algorithms that liboqs ships, from the NIST standards to the candidates of the additional-signature round: filter, sort by size, and pick one to measure. The benchmark compiles liboqs to WebAssembly, runs in a background worker on your own device and compares the result with ECDSA P-256, Ed25519 or X25519 measured the same way.

100% local — algorithm code is downloaded from this site only when you measure, and runs in your browser; nothing about your device or the results is sent anywhere

103 algorithms from liboqs 0.15.1: 38 key encapsulation mechanisms and 65 signature schemes, in 15 families.

ML-KEM-768

Family
ML-KEM
Kind
Key encapsulation mechanism
Hard problem
Module lattices (Module-LWE / Module-SIS)
Status
NIST standard
Reference
FIPS 203
NIST security level
3
liboqs name
ML-KEM-768

Sizes next to the classical algorithms

Public key
AlgorithmPublic key
ML-KEM-768
1,184 B
X25519
32 B
Ciphertext
AlgorithmSignature / ciphertext
ML-KEM-768
1,088 B
X25519
32 B

Public key plus ciphertext: 35.5× X25519. Classical sizes are raw encodings: uncompressed EC points, r‖s for ECDSA, a PKCS #1 key for RSA-2048.

  • Standardised in FIPS 203 (August 2024). The KEM to deploy: TLS, SSH and HPKE already define how to use it.

Measure on this device

Runs key generation and encapsulation and decapsulation in a background worker, about 3 seconds at most per operation, and the same operations of X25519 for comparison. Every result is checked, so a broken build cannot report a fast but wrong number.

Classical baseline
Filter the zoo
Kind

103 algorithms of 103

Post-quantum algorithms of liboqs 0.15.1
AlgorithmFamilyStatusLevelPublic keyPrivate keySignature / ciphertextKey + output (log scale)
SLH-DSANIST standard132 B64 B17,088 B
SLH-DSANIST standard132 B64 B7,856 B
SLH-DSANIST standard132 B64 B17,088 B
SLH-DSANIST standard132 B64 B7,856 B
SLH-DSANIST standard348 B96 B35,664 B
SLH-DSANIST standard348 B96 B16,224 B
SLH-DSANIST standard348 B96 B35,664 B
SLH-DSANIST standard348 B96 B16,224 B
CROSSNIST candidate154 B32 B9,120 B
CROSSNIST candidate154 B32 B11,980 B
CROSSNIST candidate154 B32 B8,960 B
SLH-DSANIST standard564 B128 B49,856 B
SLH-DSANIST standard564 B128 B29,792 B
SLH-DSANIST standard564 B128 B49,856 B
SLH-DSANIST standard564 B128 B29,792 B
CROSSNIST candidate177 B32 B13,152 B
CROSSNIST candidate177 B32 B18,432 B
CROSSNIST candidate177 B32 B12,432 B
CROSSNIST candidate383 B48 B22,464 B
CROSSNIST candidate383 B48 B26,772 B
CROSSNIST candidate383 B48 B20,452 B
CROSSNIST candidate5106 B64 B40,100 B
CROSSNIST candidate5106 B64 B48,102 B
CROSSNIST candidate5106 B64 B36,454 B
CROSSNIST candidate3115 B48 B29,853 B
CROSSNIST candidate3115 B48 B41,406 B
CROSSNIST candidate3115 B48 B28,391 B
CROSSNIST candidate5153 B64 B53,527 B
CROSSNIST candidate5153 B64 B74,590 B
CROSSNIST candidate5153 B64 B50,818 B
NTRUNot selected by NIST1699 B935 B699 B
CRYSTALS-KyberSuperseded1800 B1,632 B768 B
ML-KEMNIST standard1800 B1,632 B768 B
FalconSelected by NIST, standard in preparation1897 B1,281 B≤ 752 B
FalconSelected by NIST, standard in preparation1897 B1,281 B666 B
NTRUNot selected by NIST3930 B1,234 B930 B
SNOVANIST candidate11,016 B48 B248 B
SNOVANIST candidate11,016 B48 B248 B
SNOVANIST candidate11,016 B36,848 B248 B
SNOVANIST candidate11,016 B36,848 B248 B
NTRUNot selected by NIST31,138 B1,450 B1,138 B
Streamlined NTRU PrimeNot selected by NIST31,158 B1,763 B1,039 B
CRYSTALS-KyberSuperseded31,184 B2,400 B1,088 B
ML-KEMNIST standard31,184 B2,400 B1,088 B
NTRUNot selected by NIST51,230 B1,590 B1,230 B
ML-DSANIST standard21,312 B2,560 B2,420 B
MAYONIST candidate11,420 B24 B454 B
CRYSTALS-KyberSuperseded51,568 B3,168 B1,568 B
ML-KEMNIST standard51,568 B3,168 B1,568 B
SNOVANIST candidate11,579 B48 B379 B
FalconSelected by NIST, standard in preparation51,793 B2,305 B≤ 1,462 B
FalconSelected by NIST, standard in preparation51,793 B2,305 B1,280 B
NTRUNot selected by NIST51,842 B2,366 B1,842 B
ML-DSANIST standard31,952 B4,032 B3,309 B
HQCSelected by NIST, standard in preparation12,249 B2,305 B4,433 B
SNOVANIST candidate12,320 B48 B165 B
NTRUNot selected by NIST52,401 B2,983 B2,401 B
ML-DSANIST standard52,592 B4,896 B4,627 B
SNOVANIST candidate32,716 B48 B454 B
MAYONIST candidate32,986 B32 B681 B
SNOVANIST candidate34,112 B48 B376 B
HQCSelected by NIST, standard in preparation34,522 B4,586 B8,978 B
MAYONIST candidate14,912 B24 B186 B
MAYONIST candidate55,554 B40 B964 B
SNOVANIST candidate56,006 B48 B286 B
HQCSelected by NIST, standard in preparation57,245 B7,317 B14,421 B
SNOVANIST candidate58,016 B48 B576 B
FrodoKEMNot selected by NIST19,616 B19,888 B9,752 B
FrodoKEMNot selected by NIST19,616 B19,888 B9,752 B
eFrodoKEMNot selected by NIST19,616 B19,888 B9,720 B
eFrodoKEMNot selected by NIST19,616 B19,888 B9,720 B
SNOVANIST candidate39,842 B48 B124 B
FrodoKEMNot selected by NIST315,632 B31,296 B15,792 B
FrodoKEMNot selected by NIST315,632 B31,296 B15,792 B
eFrodoKEMNot selected by NIST315,632 B31,296 B15,744 B
eFrodoKEMNot selected by NIST315,632 B31,296 B15,744 B
FrodoKEMNot selected by NIST521,520 B43,088 B21,696 B
FrodoKEMNot selected by NIST521,520 B43,088 B21,696 B
eFrodoKEMNot selected by NIST521,520 B43,088 B21,632 B
eFrodoKEMNot selected by NIST521,520 B43,088 B21,632 B
SNOVANIST candidate531,266 B48 B178 B
UOVNIST candidate143,576 B237,896 B128 B
UOVNIST candidate143,576 B32 B128 B
UOVNIST candidate166,576 B348,704 B96 B
UOVNIST candidate166,576 B32 B96 B
UOVNIST candidate3189,232 B1,044,320 B200 B
UOVNIST candidate3189,232 B32 B200 B
Classic McElieceNot selected by NIST1261,120 B6,492 B96 B
Classic McElieceNot selected by NIST1261,120 B6,492 B96 B
UOVNIST candidate1278,432 B237,896 B128 B
UOVNIST candidate1412,160 B348,704 B96 B
UOVNIST candidate5446,992 B2,436,704 B260 B
UOVNIST candidate5446,992 B32 B260 B
Classic McElieceNot selected by NIST3524,160 B13,608 B156 B
Classic McElieceNot selected by NIST3524,160 B13,608 B156 B
Classic McElieceNot selected by NIST51,044,992 B13,932 B208 B
Classic McElieceNot selected by NIST51,044,992 B13,932 B208 B
Classic McElieceNot selected by NIST51,047,319 B13,948 B194 B
Classic McElieceNot selected by NIST51,047,319 B13,948 B194 B
UOVNIST candidate31,225,440 B1,044,320 B200 B
Classic McElieceNot selected by NIST51,357,824 B14,120 B208 B
Classic McElieceNot selected by NIST51,357,824 B14,120 B208 B
UOVNIST candidate52,869,440 B2,436,704 B260 B

What is in the zoo

The zoo lists every key encapsulation mechanism and signature scheme of liboqs 0.15.1, the C library of the Open Quantum Safe project, as packaged for the web by @oqs/liboqs-js: 103 parameter sets in 15 families. For each one you see the sizes that decide whether it fits a protocol — public key, private key, signature or ciphertext — its NIST security level, the hard problem it rests on, and how far it has come in standardization. Pick any of them and the lab measures it on your own device against the classical algorithm it would replace.

Where each family stands

The status column follows NIST's post-quantum project as of 20 October 2026:

  • Standards. ML-KEM (FIPS 203), ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), final since August 2024. These are the algorithms to deploy, and the ones TLS, X.509, JOSE and HPKE now define.
  • Selected, standard in preparation. Falcon, which NIST is turning into FN-DSA (FIPS 206, not final yet; liboqs still ships round-3 Falcon, which FN-DSA will not match byte for byte), and HQC, the code-based KEM NIST picked in March 2025 (NIST IR 8545) as a backup resting on a different problem than ML-KEM.
  • Candidates. MAYO, UOV, SNOVA and CROSS are in NIST's process for additional signatures, which looks for schemes with short signatures or assumptions other than lattices. None is a standard; their parameters may still change.
  • Not selected. Classic McEliece, FrodoKEM, NTRU and Streamlined NTRU Prime were evaluated and not chosen by NIST. That is not a verdict of insecurity: Germany's BSI recommends FrodoKEM and Classic McEliece for conservative deployments, both are part of an ISO/IEC 18033-2 amendment, and OpenSSH used sntrup761x25519-sha512 before it moved to ML-KEM.
  • Superseded. CRYSTALS-Kyber as submitted to round 3. FIPS 203 changed it, so Kyber and ML-KEM do not interoperate; liboqs keeps it for existing deployments.

Sizes first

For most systems the bytes matter more than the microseconds. A TLS handshake with X25519MLKEM768 carries 2,336 bytes for the key exchange instead of 64; an ML-DSA-65 signature is 3,309 bytes against 64 for Ed25519. The families spread over four orders of magnitude: UOV signatures start at 96 bytes, with public keys of up to 2.8 MB, Classic McEliece ciphertexts are under 210 bytes with public keys of up to 1.3 MB, and SLH-DSA keys are 32 to 64 bytes with signatures of up to 49,856. The table's last column puts public key plus signature or ciphertext on a logarithmic scale, the only one on which all of them fit. Sort by it to find the smallest exchange of each kind.

How the benchmark measures

Measuring downloads one liboqs module from this site — JavaScript with the WebAssembly embedded, about 18 to 55 KB when compressed — and runs it in a Web Worker, so the page stays responsive even while Classic McEliece generates a megabyte-sized key. For each operation the runner first calibrates a batch: how many operations it takes to last at least 5 milliseconds, because browsers coarsen performance.now() to 0.1 ms on pages that are not cross-origin isolated. It then times eleven batches and reports the median per operation, within a budget of three seconds per operation, so the slowest sets report fewer samples and say so.

Every result is checked while it is measured: each signature must verify, a tampered signature must not, and each decapsulation must recover the encapsulated secret. A miscompiled module cannot report a fast but wrong number. The sizes the module produces are compared with the registry too.

The classical baselines run the same way, through WebCrypto (the browser's native implementation) or through the @noble/curves JavaScript library: ECDSA P-256 and Ed25519 for signatures, X25519 for key encapsulation, used as a KEM by sending a fresh ephemeral public key. Where the browser's WebCrypto lacks Ed25519 or X25519, the JavaScript version stands in and the page says so.

What stays local

The zoo takes no input of yours: keys are generated inside the worker for the measurement and discarded. The modules come from this site, and neither your device's details nor the results are sent anywhere. A share link records only the selected algorithm and the filters.

From the zoo to the standards

To use the standardized algorithms rather than time them, the post-quantum signature lab signs and verifies ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and Falcon with every FIPS option, and the ML-KEM lab runs the TLS hybrids. FN-DSA vs ML-DSA and ML-DSA vs SLH-DSA weigh the signature families against each other, and Post-quantum migration in 2026 explains which deadlines apply.