The first field of a TLSA record.
Source: DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Parameters (IANA), retrieved 2026-10-20. Data license: CC0-1.0. TLSA Certificate Usages
Notes on notable entries
PKIX-TA (0) requires a chain to a public CA and that the CA match the TLSA record; RFC 7672 advises against it for SMTP.
Usages 0 and 1 add a DNS constraint on top of ordinary Web PKI validation. For SMTP between mail servers, RFC 7672 §3.1.3 says TLSA records SHOULD NOT use them: an attacker who can forge DNS can replace them anyway, and mail servers share no common list of trusted CAs.
DANE-TA (2) pins a trust anchor — usually the issuing CA — in DNS.
With usage 2 the server's chain must lead to the certificate or key in the TLSA record, which need not be a public CA. RFC 7672 §3.1.2 requires the server to send the trust anchor in its chain when the record matches a key rather than a full certificate.
DANE-EE (3) pins the server's own certificate or key in DNS; names and expiry in the certificate are not checked.
With usage 3 the TLSA record alone binds the key to the name: RFC 7672 §3.1.1 says the server is authenticated even if no name in the certificate matches and that the certificate's expiry date MUST be ignored. The common record '3 1 1' (DANE-EE, SPKI, SHA-256) survives certificate renewals as long as the key stays the same.