BoringSSL

Facts and the checks behind them

Nothing below is copied from documentation. The check content/libraries/verify/boringssl/run.sh ran BoringSSL 2026-10-19-b50cad27ee80 in the container image debian:trixie-20261005-slim on October 20, 2026; the page must match what it printed, and each fact lists those lines.

• ECDSA signature encoding

  der

  EVP_DigestSign produces ASN.1 DER.

  Recorded by the check

  fact ecdsa-signature-encoding = der

• ECDSA nonce

  random

  Random nonce: two signatures of the same message differ.

  Recorded by the check

  fact ecdsa-nonce = random

• Low-S when signing

  either

  s is not normalized: high-S values appeared among 64 signatures.

  Recorded by the check

  fact ecdsa-low-s-sign = either

• High-S when verifying

  accepts-high-s

  A DER signature with s replaced by n − s verified.

  Recorded by the check

  fact ecdsa-low-s-verify = accepts-high-s

• What the signing call hashes

  hashes-message-or-digest

  EVP_DigestSign hashes; ECDSA_sign signs a digest, and that signature verified against the message.

  Recorded by the check

  fact ecdsa-prehash = hashes-message-or-digest

• Malformed ECDSA signature

  returns-false

  EVP_DigestVerify returned 0 for a raw r‖s signature and for a 3-byte blob.

  Recorded by the check

  fact ecdsa-malformed-signature = returns-false
  evidence ecdsa-malformed-signature: EVP_DigestVerify returned 0 for raw r||s and 0 for 3 bytes (1 = valid, 0 = invalid)

• ECDSA curves

  P-224P-256P-384P-521

  P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521; there is no secp256k1 group.

  Recorded by the check

  fact ecdsa-curves = P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521
  evidence ecdsa-curves: EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp256k1): NULL

• EdDSA

  Ed25519

  Ed25519 through ED25519_sign and ED25519_verify; EVP_PKEY_ED448 is defined, but generating an Ed448 key failed.

  Recorded by the check

  fact eddsa = Ed25519
  evidence eddsa: EVP_PKEY_ED448 is defined; generating an Ed448 key through EVP: fails

• Post-quantum algorithms

  ML-KEMML-DSASLH-DSA

  ML-KEM-768 encapsulated and decapsulated, and ML-DSA-65 and SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signed and verified, through their dedicated headers.

  Recorded by the check

  fact pqc = ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA
  evidence pqc: ssl.h defines SSL_GROUP_X25519_MLKEM768 = 0x11ec
  evidence pqc: ML-DSA-65 signature 3309 bytes

Usage

#include <openssl/mldsa.h>
#include <openssl/mlkem.h>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

int main(void) {
    /* ML-KEM-768: the receiver publishes the encoded public key. */
    uint8_t pub[MLKEM768_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES], ct[MLKEM768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES];
    uint8_t ss_sender[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES], ss_receiver[MLKEM_SHARED_SECRET_BYTES];
    struct MLKEM768_private_key priv;
    struct MLKEM768_public_key pk;
    MLKEM768_generate_key(pub, NULL, &priv);
    CBS cbs;
    CBS_init(&cbs, pub, sizeof pub);
    if (!MLKEM768_parse_public_key(&pk, &cbs)) return 1;
    MLKEM768_encap(ct, ss_sender, &pk);
    MLKEM768_decap(ss_receiver, ct, sizeof ct, &priv);
    printf("ML-KEM-768 secrets match: %d\n", memcmp(ss_sender, ss_receiver, sizeof ss_sender) == 0);

    /* ML-DSA-65 with an empty context string. */
    static const uint8_t msg[] = "release manifest";
    uint8_t dpub[MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES], seed[MLDSA_SEED_BYTES];
    struct MLDSA65_private_key *dpriv = malloc(sizeof *dpriv);
    struct MLDSA65_public_key *dpk = malloc(sizeof *dpk);
    uint8_t *sig = malloc(MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES);
    MLDSA65_generate_key(dpub, seed, dpriv);
    MLDSA65_public_from_private(dpk, dpriv);
    MLDSA65_sign(sig, dpriv, msg, sizeof msg - 1, NULL, 0);
    printf("ML-DSA-65 verified: %d\n", MLDSA65_verify(dpk, sig, MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_BYTES, msg, sizeof msg - 1, NULL, 0));
    free(dpriv); free(dpk); free(sig);
    return 0;
}