liboqs (Open Quantum Safe)

事实及其依据的检查

以下内容均非抄自文档。检查脚本 content/libraries/verify/liboqs/run.sh 于2026年10月20日在容器镜像 debian:trixie-20261005-slim 中运行了 liboqs (Open Quantum Safe) 0.16.0；本页内容必须与它的输出一致，每条事实都列出了对应的输出行。

• ECDSA 曲线

  none

  不支持 ECDSA：所有已启用的算法标识符都属于后量子算法族。

  检查记录

  fact ecdsa-curves = none

• EdDSA

  none

  不支持 EdDSA：liboqs 只实现后量子方案。

  检查记录

  fact eddsa = none

• 后量子算法

  ML-KEMML-DSASLH-DSAFalconHQCClassic-McElieceFrodoKEMBIKENTRUsntrup761KyberMAYOCROSSUOVSNOVAMQOM

  在默认构建中，所列每个算法族都有一个参数集完成了密钥生成、封装或签名，以及解封装或验证。

  检查记录

  fact pqc = ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, Falcon, HQC, Classic-McEliece, FrodoKEM, BIKE, NTRU, sntrup761, Kyber, MAYO, CROSS, UOV, SNOVA, MQOM
  evidence pqc: enabled: 41 KEMs, 221 signature schemes, 0 stateful signature schemes
  evidence pqc: enabled parameter sets by identifier prefix: ML-KEM- 3, ML-DSA- 3, SLH_DSA 156, Falcon- 4, HQC- 3, Classic-McEliece- 10, FrodoKEM- 6, eFrodoKEM- 6, BIKE- 3, NTRU- 6, sntrup 1, Kyber 3, MAYO- 4, cross- 18, OV- 12, SNOVA 12, mqom2 12
  evidence pqc: first parameter set of each family run end to end; failures: none

• 有状态哈希签名

  not-built

  默认构建没有启用任何 XMSS 或 LMS 参数集。

  检查记录

  fact stateful-signatures = not-built
  evidence stateful-signatures: no XMSS or LMS parameter set is enabled in this build

• ML-DSA 签名模式

  hedged

  用同一密钥对同一消息生成的两个 ML-DSA-65 签名不同（对冲签名）。

  检查记录

  fact ml-dsa-signing = hedged
  evidence ml-dsa-signing: ML-DSA-65: public key 1952 bytes, signature 3309 bytes; two signatures of one message are different

• ML-DSA 上下文字符串

  supported

  在上下文 invoice-v1 下生成的签名，用该上下文验证通过，用 invoice-v2 和空上下文验证均失败。

  检查记录

  fact ml-dsa-context-string = supported
  evidence ml-dsa-context-string: signed with context "invoice-v1": verifies with it yes, with "invoice-v2" no, with OQS_SIG_verify no
  evidence ml-dsa-context-string: an OQS_SIG_sign signature verifies with a zero-length context: yes

• 格式错误的 ML-DSA 签名

  returns-false

  截断的签名、3 字节数据和错误的消息都返回 OQS_ERROR（-1）。

  检查记录

  fact ml-dsa-malformed-signature = returns-false
  evidence ml-dsa-malformed-signature: OQS_SIG_verify: truncated signature -1, 3 bytes -1, wrong message -1 (OQS_SUCCESS = 0, OQS_ERROR = -1)

• 被修改的 ML-KEM 密文

  implicit-rejection

  密文翻转一位后，OQS_KEM_decaps 返回 OQS_SUCCESS 和一个不同的共享密钥。

  检查记录

  fact ml-kem-modified-ciphertext = implicit-rejection
  evidence ml-kem-modified-ciphertext: ML-KEM-768 (public key 1184, ciphertext 1088 bytes): one flipped bit, OQS_KEM_decaps returned 0 and the secrets differ
  evidence ml-kem-modified-ciphertext: kem.h: OQS_API OQS_STATUS OQS_KEM_decaps(const OQS_KEM *kem, uint8_t *shared_secret, const uint8_t *ciphertext, const uint8_t *secret_key)

用法

#include <oqs/oqs.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

int main(void) {
    OQS_init();
    /* ML-KEM-768: the receiver publishes pk, the sender encapsulates a fresh secret to it. */
    OQS_KEM *kem = OQS_KEM_new(OQS_KEM_alg_ml_kem_768);
    uint8_t *pk = malloc(kem->length_public_key), *sk = malloc(kem->length_secret_key);
    uint8_t *ct = malloc(kem->length_ciphertext), sent[32], received[32];
    OQS_KEM_keypair(kem, pk, sk);
    OQS_KEM_encaps(kem, ct, sent, pk);
    /* Decapsulation never reports a damaged ciphertext: it yields a different secret instead. */
    OQS_KEM_decaps(kem, received, ct, sk);
    printf("ML-KEM-768 secrets match: %d\n", memcmp(sent, received, 32) == 0);

    /* ML-DSA-65 with a FIPS 204 context string that ties the signature to one purpose. */
    OQS_SIG *sig = OQS_SIG_new(OQS_SIG_alg_ml_dsa_65);
    uint8_t *vk = malloc(sig->length_public_key), *dk = malloc(sig->length_secret_key);
    uint8_t *s = malloc(sig->length_signature);
    const uint8_t msg[] = "order #1042 approved", ctx[] = "invoice-v1";
    size_t len = 0;
    OQS_SIG_keypair(sig, vk, dk);
    OQS_SIG_sign_with_ctx_str(sig, s, &len, msg, sizeof msg - 1, ctx, sizeof ctx - 1, dk);
    OQS_STATUS rc = OQS_SIG_verify_with_ctx_str(sig, msg, sizeof msg - 1, s, len, ctx, sizeof ctx - 1, vk);
    printf("ML-DSA-65 verified: %d (%zu-byte signature)\n", rc == OQS_SUCCESS, len);

    OQS_MEM_secure_free(sk, kem->length_secret_key);
    OQS_MEM_secure_free(dk, sig->length_secret_key);
    free(pk), free(ct), free(vk), free(s);
    OQS_KEM_free(kem), OQS_SIG_free(sig);
    OQS_destroy();
    return 0;
}